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Executive governance of mind' in which 'biographers take it for granted that their task is to portray their subject as more worthy than she or he might otherwise be thought to be (Pimlott 1994, p. 157) . For all the dangers of becoming 'valets to the famous' (Pimlott 1994, p. 159) , this tradition has produced many accomplished life histories. The volume of 'private information' reported in the work of biographers is impressive, and will bear such secondary analysis as mapping the membership of the prime ministerial courts (see section 5.2 below).
Life history can be a tool for answering broader questions in the study of politics that go beyond the life itself; they are not just chronological narratives (Walter 2002 , Rhodes 2012a . Often the uses of biography are cast in general terms. Thus, Pimlott (1999, pp. 39, 41 ) writes about 'a character in an environment' because it 'illuminates a changing environment'. He wrote about Harold Wilson 'as a way of assessing the change of attitudes that swept Britain in the post-war period, and especially in the 1960s'. So, political scientists writing life history can and do apply insights from the academic study of politics.
Core executive
The core executive approach was developed in the analysis of British government by Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990) , but it has travelled well (Elgie 1997 (Elgie , p. 2011 . It defines the executive in functional terms. So, instead of asking which position is important, we can ask which functions define the innermost part or heart of government. For example, the core functions of the British executive are to pull together and integrate central government policies and to act as final arbiters of conflicts between different elements of the government machine. These functions can be carried out by institutions other than prime minister and cabinet; for example, the Treasury and the Cabinet Office.
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Executive governance But power is contingent and relational; that is, it depends on the relative power of other actors and events. Ministers depend on the prime minister for support in getting funds from the Treasury. In turn, prime ministers depend on their ministers to deliver the party's electoral promises. Both ministers and prime ministers depend on the health of the global economy for a stable currency and economic growth to ensure the needed financial resources are available. This power-dependence approach focuses on the distribution of such resources as money and authority in the core executive and explores the shifting patterns of dependence between the several actors. Power relations vary because all core executive actors have some resources, but no one consistently commands all the resources necessary to achieve their goals. So, they exchange such resources as, for example, money, legislative authority or expertise. These exchanges take the form of games in which actors manoeuvre for advantage.
The term 'core executive' directs our attention, therefore, to the key questions of 'who does what' and 'who has what resources' (and for examples of work in this idiom see : Elgie 1997 and 2011, Rhodes 1995 , Smith 1999 and their citations).
Prime Ministerial Predominance
This thesis is associated with the work of Richard Heffernan. He argues the proposition that power is relational and based on dependency is 'only partially accurate. Power is relational between actors but it is also locational. It is dependent on where actors are to be found in the core executive, and whether they are at the centre or the periphery of key core executive networks' (Heffernan 2003, p. 348) . Power-dependence characterizes core executive relationships, so Heffernan focuses on the distribution and dispersal of resources and shifting patterns of dependence between multiple actors. Prime ministers command many 'institutional resources', including patronage, prestige, authority, political centrality and policy reach, knowledge, information and expertise, control of the agenda, and Crown Prerogative; for Executive governance example, to delegate powers and responsibilities to ministers and departments (Heffernan 2003, pp. 356-57) . They also have 'personal resources' such as: reputation, skill and ability; association with political success; public popularity; and high standing in his or her party (Heffernan 2003, p. 351; 2005, p. 16) . It follows that the more resources a prime minister has, or can accumulate, the greater their potential for predominance. But many ministers also have resources that are not necessarily available to prime ministers. They can include 'a professional, permanent and knowledgeable staff, expert knowledge and relevant policy networks, time, information, and, not least, an annual budget' (Heffernan 2005, p. 614) . There is much variation between countries but the minister without resources is the exception rather than the rule.
From the start, Heffernan's (2003, p. 350 ) argument about predominance had many qualifications. He suggested that prime ministerial authority is 'contingent and contextual'.
Prime ministers have the 'potential' to be predominant 'but only when personal resources are married with institutional power resources, and when the prime minister is able to use both wisely and well'. So, the prime minister's personal resources are 'never guaranteed. They come and go, are acquired and a squandered, are won and lost' (Heffernan 2003, p. 356) . Later versions of the prime ministerial dominance argument also make significant qualifications (Heffernan 2005, pp. 616-7) . In short, contingency, or one damned thing after another, means that predominance is transient.
So, we read the later Heffernan (2005) and Bennister and Heffernan (2011) as an important set of qualifications to the prime ministerial predominance argument. It is significant that they wrote their first version during the heyday of the Blair 'presidency', while their qualifications reflect his later decline. In his most recent article, in reply to Dowding (2013) , Heffernan (2013, pp. 642 and 643) emphasises that the prime ministers can have 'more or less political capital' and their 'power waxes and wanes'. These qualifications downplay prime 7 Executive governance ministerial predominance and bridge the gap between their approach and proponents of the core executive (see section 4.1).
APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE
The literature on governance is large and scattered (see Kjaer 2004 , Pierre 2000 . We describe the main waves of governance in the study of public administration: network governance and metagovernance (and for more detail see Rhodes 2012b).
Network governance
The network governance literature has been reviewed and classified many times before (Börzel 1998 , Klijn 1997 and 2006c . We offer only a brief recap of the several strands (see section on 'Political accountability or webs of accountabilities').
In Britain, the first-wave of governance narratives is referred to as the 'Anglogovernance school' (Marinetto 2003) . It starts with the notion of policy networks or sets of organizations clustered around a major government function or department. Central departments need the cooperation of such groups to deliver services. For many policy areas, actors are interdependent and decisions are a product of their game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by the participants. Trust and reciprocity are essential for cooperative behaviour and, therefore, the existence of the network.
These networks are a distinctive coordinating mechanism different from markets and hierarchies and not a hybrid of them. Such networks have significant degree of autonomy from the state -they are self-organizing -although the state can indirectly and imperfectly steer them Executive governance (Rhodes 1997, p. 53) . In sum, for the Anglo-governance School', governance refers to governing with and through networks (see Rhodes 2007 ).
In Germany, there is the work of Renate Mayntz, Fritz Schapf and their colleagues at the Max Planck Institute on steuerungtheorie (see for example, Marin and Mayntz 1991, and Scharpf 1997) . They were among the first to treat networks, not as interest group intermediation, but as a mode of governance.
In the Netherlands, scholars at the Erasmus University focused on more effective ways 
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Executive governance Critics of the first-wave characteristically focus on the argument the state has been hollowed out. For example, Pierre and Peters (2000, pp. 78, 104-5 and 111) argue the shift to network governance could 'increase public control over society' because governments 'rethink the mix of policy instruments'. As a result, 'coercive or regulatory instruments become less important and … "softer" instruments gain importance'. In short, the state has not been hollowed-out but reasserted its capacity to govern by regulating the mix of governing structures such as markets and networks and deploying indirect instruments of control (see for example: Bell and Hindmoor 2009 , Jessop 2000 , Kooiman 2003 , and Sørensen and Torfing 2007 .
Metagovernance refers to this new mix; to the state's use of negotiation, diplomacy, and more informal modes of steering to secure coordination. As with network governance, metagovernance comes in several varieties (Sørensen and Torfing 2007, pp. 170-80) . However, these approaches share a concern with the varied ways in which the state now steers organizations, governments and networks rather than directly providing services through state bureaucracies, or rowing. These other organizations undertake much of the work of governing; they implement policies, they provide public services, and at times they even regulate themselves. The state governs the organizations that govern civil society; 'the governance of government and governance' (Jessop 2000, p. 23) . Moreover, the other organizations characteristically have a degree of autonomy from the state; they are often voluntary or private sector groups or they are governmental agencies or tiers of government separate from the core executive. So, the state cannot govern them solely by the instruments that work in bureaucracies (see section 4.2).
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THE PUZZLES
According to the literature on executive studies, we have witnessed the emergence of the predominant prime minister. According to the Anglo-governance school, the core executive's capacity to steer is reduced or hollowed-out from above by international interdependencies such as membership of the EU, from below by marketization and networks, and from within by the competing agendas and ambitions of ministers and agencies. As Helms (2012, p. 2) argues:
The 'governance turn' in political science moved the focus of political analysis on decision making and problem solving but at the same time cultivated strongly sceptical views about the possible relevance of individual political leaders.
We unpack this broad characterization of the relationship between the two fields of study by focusing focus on four 'puzzles' (Heclo 1974, pp. 305-6) : predominant or collaborative leadership; central capability or implementation; formal or informal coordination; and managerial accountability or webs of accountabilities. We have devised these puzzles to encompass and systematize the diverse debates in executive governance. In particular, we focus on shared puzzles; on the intersection of executive studies and governance.
Predominant or collaborative leadership
The classic debate in the Westminster formal institutional tradition (see section 2.1) concerned the relative power of prime minister and cabinet (see Blick and Jones 2010, chapters 1 and 2), Latterly, the presidentialization thesis took over from this debate. For Poguntke and Webb (2005, pp. 5 and 7), presidentialization has three faces: the executive face, the party face, and the electoral face. Presidentialization occurs when there is a shift of 11 Executive governance 'political power resources and autonomy to the benefit of individual leaders' along each face and a corresponding loss to such collective actors as cabinet (see also see : Foley, 2000: chapter 1). The problem with this argument is that it was both mislabelled and overstated.
We do not have the space (or indeed inclination) to rehash the debate (see for example, Dowding 2013 , and the several replies in Parliamentary Affairs, 66 (3) 2013). We restrict ourselves to three comments.
First, in the electoral arena, personalization is a prominent feature of media management in all countries and has a significant if small electoral effect in most. If we must use presidential language, it is here in the electoral and party arena that it is most apt. We live in an era of spatial leadership in which prime ministers cultivate selective political detachment or distance from their party and their government, especially their problems (Foley 2000, p. 31) .
Second, in the policymaking arena, there is some truth to the claim of a centralization of policymaking on the prime minister. However, this claim applies to selected policy areas, with the equally important qualification that the prime minister's attention is also selective (see section 4.2).
The prime minister's influence is most constrained in the policy implementation arena. This arena is conspicuous for its absence in the presidentialization thesis. It is central to the network governance narrative. In this account, other senior government figures, ministers and their departments, and other agencies are key actors. There is much that goes on in government about which the prime minister knows little and affects even less. Many of these policy arenas are embedded in dependent relationships with domestic and international agencies and governments, making command and control strategies counterproductive. So, there is another story of prime ministerial power that focuses on the problems of governance 12 Executive governance and sees the prime minister as constantly involved in negotiations and diplomacy with a host of other politicians, officials, and citizens.
We accept that prime ministers can be predominant but few control and then only for some policies, some of the time. At this point, the argument can be helpfully recast taking account of the network literature. Holliday (1996 and see the prime minister as the core, or nodal point, of the core networks supported by enhanced central resources that increase his or her power potential. However, 'the enhancement of central capacity within the British system of government reflects contingent factors, including the personalities of strategically-placed individuals (notably, but not only, the PM)'. They note that such changes are 'driven by prime ministerial whim' and 'if they so desire, [prime ministers] try to shape the core in their own image'. However, their ability to manage these core networks 'depends on the motivation and skill of key actors, and on the circumstances in which they find themselves at any given moment in time' (Burch and Holliday 2004, pp. 17 and 20) . Similarly, Helms' (2005) comparative study accepts that resource exchange is central to analysing executive leadership (see Elgie 2011 for further comparative citations). The shared meeting ground for all sides in this debate is the idea that the prime minister is the 'principal node of key core executive networks' (Heffernan 2005, p. 613) .
We can now introduce a second strand to the network governance literature. Accepting that central actors depend on subnational and other actors for the delivery of key services, the network governance literature explores the limits to command and control strategies and explores other cooperative leadership styles. The literature on collaborative governance will serve as an example.
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Executive governance Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 544) define collaborative governance as a collective decision-making process 'where one or more public agencies directly engages non-state stakeholders' in the 'formal, consensus oriented, and deliberative' implementation of public policy or management of public programmes. The key question is whether opposing stakeholders can work together in a collaborative way. The answer is a 'cautious yes', and a key part of that answer is leadership, which is: 'crucial for setting and maintaining clear ground rules, building trust, facilitating dialogue, and exploring mutual gains' (Ansell and Gash 2008, pp. 12-13) . Such leadership is variously described as, hands-off, soft, integrative, facilitative or diplomatic. The shared feature is that it is not directive, hands-on, or command and control. There is also a related literature on how to manage your networks that focuses on As well as pointing to the limits to centralizing strategies, the metagovernance literature also argues for a new toolkit for central agencies. Its proponents argue there are several ways in which the state can steer, rather than command, the other actors involved in governance (see for example Jessop 2000, pp. 23-4, and . First, the state can set the rules of the game for other actors and then leave them to do what they will within those rules; they work 'in the shadow of hierarchy'. So, it can redesign markets, reregulate policy sectors, or introduce constitutional change, Second, the state can try to steer other actors using storytelling. It can organize dialogues, foster meanings, beliefs, and identities among the relevant actors, and influence what actors think and do. Third, the state can steer by the way in which it distributes resources such as money and authority. It can play a boundary spanning role, alter the balance between actors in a network; act as a court of appeal when conflict arises; rebalance the mix of governing structures; and step in when network governance fails.
Finally, a central image in the governance narrative is of a pendulum swinging from centralization to governance and back. Against the centralizing strategies of the core executive networks, it argues for a bottom-up, not a top-down, view of government. The focus is implementation, yet for many the study of implementation is one of 'yesterday's issues' (Hill 1997) and an 'intellectual dead end' with 'lots of leads, little results' (deLeon and deLeon 2002). The governance narrative revives to the topic, highlighting that implementation is mediated through the actions of front-line workers whose perspectives reflected local conditions, local knowledge and professional norms. Thus, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, chapter 12) argue street-level bureaucrats "actually make policy choices rather than simply implement the decisions of elected officials." They fix client identities,
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Executive governance often stereotyping them, which, in turn fixes the occupational identity of the street-level bureaucrat as, for example, bleeding heart or hardnosed, which, in turn, sets the decision premises for the street-level bureaucrat's judgments. They manage the "irreconcilable" dilemmas posed by clients' needs, administrative supervision (of rules and resources), and the exercise of state power. They are not heroes, but they are an example of bottom-up leadership; of the complexities of network governance Executive studies may pay little attention, but implementation remains a critical issue for governments of all persuasions and a central concern of the governance narrative. When service provision spans governmental jurisdictions, and the public and private sectors, it involves markets or contracts and patient choice, hierarchy or bureaucracy, and networks or partnerships. Not only does each implementation structure have its own set of strengths and weaknesses but mixing these structures can be like mixing oil and water. Implementation studies dramatize the dilemmas of core executives confronted by network governance.
Formal or informal coordination
The spread of network governance also undermines coordination. Despite strong pressures for more coordination, the practice is 'modest'. It is negative, organized by specific established networks; rarely strategic, intermittent, selective, sectoral, politicized, issue- Networks make the goal of coordination ever more elusive. As Peters (1998, p. 302) argues 'strong vertical linkages between social groups and public organizations makes effective coordination and horizontal linkages within government more difficult'. Once agreement is reached in the network, 'the latitude for negotiation by public organizations at the top of the network is limited'. However, these remarks presume hierarchy is the most important or appropriate mechanism for coordination. Many years ago, Lindblom (1965) persuasively argued that indirect coordination or mutual adjustment was messy but effective.
Public transit in the San Francisco Bay Area is a multi-organizational network and Chisholm
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Executive governance (1989, p. 195) shows that only some coordination can take place by central direction, so 'personal trust developed through informal relationships acts a lubricant for mutual adjustment'.
Core executives confront two broad tasks in such multi-organizational networks. They have to manage not only individual networks but they also confront a portfolio of networks, Central agencies are the nodal points for both the portfolio and individual networks. Each of central agency belongs to, and seeks to manage, a group of networks; its 'multi network portfolio' (Ysa and Esteve 2013) . Managing the network portfolio has its own distinct challenges. The most obvious challenge is to find out which networks the agency is trying to manage. All too often, an agency has no map of its own networks let alone the networks of other central agencies. There will be no mechanisms for coordinating the responses of a central agency to either the portfolio or individual networks. Networks are messy. There are no guarantees of successful results, only the relentless pressure from the sour laws of network governance and the imperatives of constant nurturing. The role of any central agency is to manage their network portfolio, and to provide collaborative leadership.
In sum, coordination is the holy grail of modern government, ever sought, but always just beyond reach, and networks bring central coordination no nearer. However, they do provide their own informal, decentralized version, provided the core executive can tolerate the mess.
Political accountability or webs of accountabilities
A central theme in executive studies that follows logically from the claim of a predominant or presidential prime minister is the loss of accountability. Thus, Savoie (2008, p. 232) argues that centralization suits prime ministers because they can set aside formal
19
Executive governance processes and get things done quicker. But there are significant costs. Savoie (2008, pp. 230 and 339) argues that the key adverse consequences are centralization and the collapse of accountability. When there are few if any veto points, a powerful centre can act with impunity, acknowledging no other's authority. An Australian example again is instructive.
The 2001 political controversy known as the 'Children Overboard' affair arose from the allegation that refugees, also known as boat people, threw their children overboard to gain entry to Australia. The allegation was untrue but government ministers deliberately ignored 'inconvenient information'. Political staffers and public servants provided 'plausible deniability' for ministers in parliament and the media (for the relevant sources see Tiernan 2007, pp. 171-2). Veteran political journalist Paul Kelly (2009, pp. 611-12) , concludes the case exposes a 'profound failure of accountability' that was exploited for the political benefit of the government of the day.
Proponents of the governance narrative also argue there has been a breakdown of accountability, but for different reasons. They argue conventional notions of accountability do not fit when authority for service delivery is dispersed among several agencies. Bovens (1998, p. 46) identifies the 'problem of many hands' where responsibility for policy in complex organizations is shared and it is correspondingly difficult to find out who is responsible. He also notes that fragmentation, marketization and the resulting networks create 'new forms of the problem of many hands' (Bovens 1998, p. 229) . These dilemmas are often laid bare in the 'accountability and blame' phase that follows natural disasters. The police and fire services would seem to be archetypal command and control bureaucracies but responding to disasters involves many interlaced networks able to react rapidly to changing local conditions (Arklay 2012) . So, who is to blame when something goes awry -the bureaucracies or the networks? The inevitable inquiries after disasters struggle with the messiness. Hayclarity of organization when redundancy, or overlap and duplication, is strength (Landau 1979 ).
As Mulgan (2003, pp. 211-14) argues, buck-passing is much more likely in networks because responsibility is divided and the reach of political leaders is much reduced. It is common for network governance to be closed to public scrutiny, a species of private government. The brute conclusion is that we face a crisis of accountability because centralization weakens traditional accountability to parliament and the multiple accountabilities of networks erode central control,
WHITHER THE STUDY OF EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE?
Finally, we identify likely trends in the study of executives. We focus on: the interpretive turn, court politics, and presidential studies.
The Interpretive Turn
First-wave narratives of the changing state focus on issues such as the objective characteristics of policy networks and the oligopoly of the political marketplace. They stress powerdependence, the relationship between networks and policy outcomes, and the strategies by which the centre might steer networks. The second-wave narratives focus on the mix of governing structures such as markets and networks and on the various instruments of control such as changing the rules of the game, storytelling and changing the distribution of resources.
In contrast, the third wave of interpretive analysis focuses on the social construction of patterns of rule through the ability of individuals to create meanings in action. An interpretive approach highlights the importance of beliefs, practices, traditions, and dilemmas for the study of the There are many routes to this 'constructed' state and governance (see for example: Bevir and Rhodes 2010 , Dean 2007 , chapter 2, Hay 2011 , and Miller and Rose 2008 . Its singular advantage is that it is 'edifying'; it is a way of finding 'new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking about' executive governance (Rorty 1980, p. 360) .Thus, Bevir and Rhodes (2010) (see Campbell 2010 ). In its current reincarnation, the idea marries the core executive to the analysis of prime ministerial predominance (Rhodes 2013) . Also known as high politics, the approach builds on the notions of interdependence and the bargaining games of elite actors. For Cowling (1971) , the high politics approach meant studying the intentions and actions of a political leadership network which consisted of 'fifty or sixty politicians in conscious tension with one another whose accepted authority constituted political leadership'. High politics was 'a matter of rhetoric and manoeuvre' by statesmen (Cowling 1971, pp. 3-4) . For Savoie (2008, pp. 16-7) the court encompasses 'the prime minister and a small group of carefully selected courtiers'.
It also covers the 'shift from formal decision-making processes in cabinet … to informal processes involving only a handful of actors'. This conception is too narrow. We accept there is often an inner sanctum but participants in high politics are rarely so few. We prefer Cowling's more expansive definition, allied to Burch and Holliday's (1996) notion that the centre is a set of networks. These networks are still exclusive. The number of participants is still limited. But, as well as the core network or inner circle, we can also talk of circles of influence (Hennessy 2000, pp. 493-500) ; a use that resonates with political folklore and practice There are an increasing number of ethnographic fieldwork studies of governing elites and their courts (see Rhodes 2011) . Also, the information in biographies, autobiographies, memoirs and diaries can be treated as raw data for this approach (see section on 'Political Biography'). There are too many items of journalists' reportage, auto/biographies, memoirs The style and skills of individual prime ministers are indeed significant, but only as part of a broader analysis of relationships and dependencies -the 'court politics' of the core executive. The presidential studies literature has long recognised the need also to understand the leader's operating context, notably the 'bargaining uncertainty' inherent to their role when there is a separation of powers (Neustadt 1991 (Neustadt [1960 ).
Institutionalization
In the United States, the concept of the 'institutional presidency' is well established (Burke 2000) . It recognizes that 'leadership in the modern presidency is not carried out by the president alone, but rather by presidents with many associates'. Scholars of the institutional presidency have described the development of the staffing structures and advisory arrangements that support the President. They chart the growth in size and organizational complexity of the 'presidential branch'. This descriptive literature contains few lessons of wider applicability (see section on 'Central capability or implementation').
Of greater interest are the consequences of this growth. First, it creates new dependencies, pathologies and transaction costs that have not been documented (see section on 'Court Politics'). Second, it provides contending explanations of this growth. For many, it is a consequence of presidential overload (Ragsdale and Theis 1997) . Others, however, argue 25 Executive governance that 'White House staff growth is largely driven by successive presidents' search for assistance in managing interactions with Congress, the media and the public, as well as by the long-term rivalry between the president and Congress, and only marginally by an expansion in the size or workload of the federal government' (Dickinson and Lebo 2007, p. 207) .
Presidents have responded to 'a more fluid, less stable and distinctly more partisan bargaining environment' by 'embracing tactics formerly restricted to political campaigns'. So, executive growth is a response to, and fuels, executive bargaining. It can be seen as creating a presidential court with all the interpersonal conflicts and politicking such a phrase implies.
CONCLUSIONS
Executive studies and the governance narrative may interweave but they have distinct and distinctive foci. Executive studies focuses on prime ministerial predominance, building central capacity, formal top-down coordination, and traditional mechanisms of accountability. The governance narrative sees networks of dependencies, disconnected implementation structures, informal coordination and webs of accountabilities.
There are connections. Executive studies incorporate the insights of network governance. The prime ministerial predominance argument sees the prime minister as the node of the core executive networks. We suggest a focus a court politics; on the inner circle and its circles of influence, and Bennister (2007, p. 337) agrees. There are shared concerns. There is agreement on an accountability deficit, even if the accounts of its causes differ. The two literatures are the opposite sides of the same coin. The governance narrative explores the limits to executive intentions and practices. There are a plethora of 26 Executive governance shorthand phrases seeking to capture these differences: hands-on or hands-off, top-down or bottom-up, and rowing or steering, to mention only three. They all tackle the puzzles we have discussed.
Our puzzles are best likened to anomalies or incongruities. As Thomas Kuhn (1996, pp. 62-4, 67, 76, and 82) argues anomalies 'appear against the background provided by the paradigm' of normal science. However, when 'normal technical puzzling-solving activity breaks down' and 'the tools a paradigm supplies' are no longer 'capable of solving the problems it defines', then the cumulating anomalies will lead to a crisis and the transition to a new paradigm. The command and control paradigm of executive government confronts at least four anomalies. We are left puzzling about these shared puzzles and with the biggest puzzle of all; whether the interpretive paradigm offers greater edification.
